Abstract: After the formation of the British composite monarchy in 1603, a distinctive pattern of Scottish constitutionalism emerged in which a desire to maintain the Scottish realm and church encouraged an emphasis on the limitation of the monarch by fundamental law, guaranteed by oaths. The Covenanters attempted to use the National Covenant and the 1651 coronation to force the king to maintain the Presbyterian church as defined by law. Restoration royalists emphasised the untrammelled power of the king, but in the Revolution of 1688-89, the Claim of Right was presented with the oath of accession as a set of conditions designed to re-establish the Scottish realm as a 'legal limited monarchy' with a Presbyterian church. Reforms in 1640-41, 1689-90 and 1703-4 placed statutory constraints on the royal prerogative. The making of the union relied on a reassertion of monarchical sovereignty, though Presbyterian unionists ensured that the new British monarch would be required to swear to uphold the church as established by law.
nature of Scottish constitutionalism. 15 Lastly, the tercentenary of the 1707 union has stimulated fresh research on the impact of the Union of Crowns, supplemented by comparative work on early modern composite monarchies. 16 Concurrent with a rediscovery of Scottish constitutional history, fresh contextualisation has been brought to English constitutionalism, rescuing it from teleological readings as the well-spring of modern constitutions. 17 This work has emphasised the importance of religious motives in shaping constitutionalist thinking, as in Alan Cromartie's account of the twin influences of late medieval legal thought and the long Reformation on English concepts of the constitution. 18 Methodologically, researchers have become less likely to treat sources such as the Agreements of the People as 'pieces of abstract political thought'. Instead, Jason Peacey and others have seen them as 'political blueprints'
and 'adjuncts to petitioning, lobbying and rallying', deeply embedded in events. British composite monarchy can be identified in the development of practical ideas and actions designed to set meaningful limits on the Scottish monarchs in London. Over time, deliberate attempts to impose constraints on the monarch produced a distinctive-though not universally endorsedimage of Scotland as a 'legal limited monarchy'. This term, taken from the 1689 Claim of Right, represents neither a pale shadow nor an anachronistic moment of modernity, but a form of early modern constitutionalism that shaped both Scottish and British history.
'Constitutionalism' in this study indicates attempts to define a Scottish realm in which the king was constrained by law in principle, and in practice by specific, identified laws. As Ken
MacMillan has pointed out in an Atlantic context, in this era polities were understood to be regulated by aggregations of 'laws, customs, policies, and conventions' and there could be significant debate over the precise constitution of the realm. 22 In moments of conflict between 1603 and 1707, declarations and statutes sought to force the Scottish king to respect particular laws. The coronation oath and covenant oaths were used in ways designed to bind the king and nation in a contractual relationship with a mutual obligation to uphold specific laws. This might be termed 'confessional constitutionalism' in recognition of the importance placed on preserving a particular vision of the Scottish church as expressed in particular laws and national confessional oaths, especially in the National Covenant of 1638. While this paper will focus on activity that could be labelled 'presbyterian', or at least anti-episcopal, political thought with royalist and episcopalian sympathies also will be explored. Rooted in Jacobean absolutist theory and evolving in tandem with its presbyterian counterpart, royalist political thought has attracted recent scholarly attention but like presbyterian political thought, its analysis remains underdeveloped across the Union of Crowns identification of royal management in church and state with English modes of church government sharpened a desire to delineate a distinct Scottish constitution within the regal union.
As James VI rebuilt the Scottish episcopate, oppositional clergy continued to make public protestations asserting a statutory and customary basis for regular meetings of the General Assembly. 47 A more aggressive campaign of constitutionalist resistance was triggered in 1618 when a set of controversial articles was pushed through a divided General Assembly in Perth. These introduced significant changes in the sacramental practices of the Scottish reformed church, including a requirement to kneel at communion. The presbyterian cleric David Calderwood characterised the articles as illegitimate because they had not been passed by a 'free and formall Assemblie'. 48 Though parliament ratified the Articles in 1621, this was deemed invalid because parliamentary debate had been restricted and the crown and its bishops had secured undue control over the Lords of the Articles, a committee for preparing legislation. 49 A group of clerics made an unusually public protest against the ratification by posting a formal protestation on the mercat cross and kirk doors in
Edinburgh. This demanded that parliament defend the church as established by law and reject the 'corruption' represented by the Perth Assembly. 50 The protestation underpinned a subsequent campaign of civil disobedience to kneeling at communion, requiring in turn a significant extension of episcopal control over both clergy and laity through the Court of High Commission, revived by James VI in 1610.
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Accumulated discomfort with royal control of the General Assembly and parliament fuelled a constitutionalist explosion generated by the promulgation of a new prayer book by royal proclamation in 1637. 52 Protesters advanced constitutionalist arguments against the king's apparent disregard for 46 Hume, 'Ane afold admonitioun', p. 570. 47 the whol kingdome, ratified be estaits of parliament, and still since put in practice' and had been
'never yet abolished be any act of generall assemblie' or 'king and estaits in parliament'. 53 The Genevan Book of Common Order was acknowledged as a liturgical guide, with some elaboration, in the 1560 First Book of Discipline. This book was reviewed by a convention of estates and the reformers understood it to have been approved by an act of the privy council, though it was not ratified by parliament. The General Assembly in 1562 agreed to use the Genevan book for the sacraments and in 1564 added its use for 'Prayers' and ordered all parish clergy to have a copy of an authorised psalm book containing the Genevan forms. The Confession of Faith was ratified in parliament in 1560 and the authority of the church as defined by its preaching, discipline and administration of sacraments was ratified again in 1579 along with an order that all substantial householders also possess a psalm book. G. anti-Catholic Negative Confession had been sworn by the king and his household and then circulated for wider subscription. 59 The confession and its renewal in 1638 drew on the Scottish practice of banding and reflected an increasingly common post-Reformation European practice of mass oaths developed from medieval oaths of fealty and commune citizenship. 60 The 1581 oath had emphasised statute law and lawful practice in asserting that the 1560 Scottish confession of faith had been 'established and publicly confirmed by sundry acts of parliaments, and now of a long time has been openly professed by the king's majesty and whole body of this realm'. It required swearers to 'continue in the obedience of the doctrine and discipline of this kyrk' and 'defend the same'. 61 By 1585, Arthur Williamson observes, the Negative Confession was being compared to the Israelites' covenant with God. 62 In 1590, local commissioners were appointed for a national renewal of the confessional oath with an updated band enjoining all subjects to defend the true religion. 63 By the early seventeenth century, the oath was seen as a fence against creeping episcopalianism. Alexander
Hume had the 1581 oath in mind when he stated in 1609 that the 'forme of Discipline' of the kirk, its presbyterian governance by a hierarchy of church courts, had been 'affirmed to be agreeable with the Word of God', 'subscryvit be many notable preacheris and professoris of the Reformed Religioun'
and 'ratefeit in Parliament by the Prince and the whole Estatis of the kingdome: promesing by a solemn othe to remane constant thairat, and to defend it to thair lvyes end.' 64 The binding nature of the
The 1638 covenant oath elaborated the 1581 promise to maintain the reformed church by including a long list of statutes defining reformed doctrine and presbyterian discipline. It required swearers to disregard the king's recent innovations until they could be 'tryed and allowed in frie assemblies and in parliamentes'. Swearers were to defend the authority of the king insofar as this was consistent with 'the defence and preservatione of the foirsaid true religioun, liberties and lawes of the kingdome', implying a condition on the oaths of allegiance sworn at Scottish coronations. 66 The
Covenant also used an act of 1584 requiring subjects to maintain the authority of parliaments to suggest that swearers had a legal obligation to uphold acts in favour of the presbyterian church; and it renewed the demand of the 1604 Union Commission for the preservation of the fundamental laws of the realm. 67 In response to concerns about the legality of the covenant, its organisers defined it as 'a publict covenant of the collectiue body of the kingdom with God for God and the King' and therefore not subject to an act of 1425 against leagues and bonds between the lieges; and, at any rate, subjects had an overriding duty to maintain the constitutional laws and liberties of the kingdom. 68 In reply, royalists argued that the Covenant presented an unauthorised interpretation of the 1581 confession and included an illegitimate constraint on loyalty to the king. The Covenanters also sought to use the coronation oath to bind the monarch to their constitutional programme. While late medieval Scottish coronations suggested an implicit contract between king and people, the Covenanters made this explicit. 77 In his Dialogue, Buchanan had argued that the coronation oath made a mutual compact in which the people agreed to obey and the king agreed to rule by law. 78 The National Covenant stated that the 1633 coronation oath sworn by Charles I compelled him to maintain standing law in favour of the church by his promise to rule 'according to the laws, constitutions and customs of this your kingdom'. 79 When Charles declined to agree with this interpretation, the regime attempted to force his son to accept these terms through his swearing of the covenants and his subsequent coronation oath. The 1649 General Assembly demanded a covenanted coronation, asserting that 'a boundles and illimited power is to be acknowledged in no king nor magistrate' and, that regardless of any hereditary right to the crown, the young Charles would not be 'admitted to the exercise of his power' unless 'by and attour the oath of coronation', he would accept the covenants and presbyterian church government as established by the Scottish parliament. 80 This echoed a doctrine of contractual monarchy articulated by 'noblemen, barrons and uthers' at the July 1567 General Assembly. Future princes, they stated, 'befor they be crownit and inaugurat', 'sall make ther faithfull league and promise' to maintain 'the true religioun of Jesus Chryst presentlie confessit and establishit within this realme', with a 'band and contract to be mutuall and reciproque in all tymes comeing betuixt the prince and God, and also betuixt the prince and faithfull peiple.' 81 The Scottish covenants and the terms of the Scottish coronation oath before being allowed to enter Scotland and act as king. oath in 1651 were clauses making all parties subject to the covenants.
The contractual and conditional monarchy envisioned by the regime in 1651 did not survive Cromwell's conquest or the restoration of Charles II on firmly royalist grounds. Keith Brown has suggested that post-Reformation royalism had less to do with 'ideas about absolutism' than a wish to 'promote peace and stability'. 91 David Stevenson has noted the weak appeal of strict Bodinian absolutism amongst royalist nobles in the early 1640s, but Clare Jackson has observed a greater appetite for divine right royalism after the disorders of the Covenanting era. 92 By 1689, a pamphleteer could observe that the idea that kings derived their authority directly from God had taken 'deep root'. 93 Restoration royalism affirmed the unlimited authority of the ancient Scottish monarchy, based on original rather than recent constitutions, and demanded the unlimited allegiance of the subject.
After being required to swear a new oath of parliament acknowledging the king's unconditional authority, the Scottish estates in 1661 passed acts restoring royal powers to choose officers and convene meetings of parliament and reinstating the Lords of the Articles. 94 A new oath of allegiance required office-holders to indicate their acceptance of these acts. 95 This was capped with an act recissory annulling the Covenanters' constitutional programme by disqualifying all legislation passed after 1633. 96 This was justified by 'the sacred right inherent to the imperial crown (which his majesty holds immediately from God Almighty alone) and by the ancient constitution and fundamental laws of the kingdom'. 97 The conditional terms of the covenanted oaths sworn by king and people in 1651
were refuted in an act of 1662 asserting the royal supremacy over the church. These objected to measures that were lawful but considered by the revolutionaries to be unjust, such as the Lords of the Articles committee by which the king managed parliament. The Grievances asked the king to redress these concerns with new laws.
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These documents were sent to London with instructions directing a set of commissioners to read both the Claim of Right and Articles of Grievance before administering the 1567 coronation oath. 112 In a letter to William and Mary, the Convention stated that they would take the swearing of the oath as 'testimony of your majestie and the queen's acceptance' of the crown and, by implication, its accompanying terms. 113 The importance of the order of presentation is indicated by a subsequent uproar in parliament over an allegation that the commissioner for the royal burghs, Sir John Dalrymple of Stair, had attempted to hold back the Grievances until after the oath. 114 An act recognising the authority of the royal couple noted that William and Mary had sworn 'the oath appointed by law to be taken by all kings and queens of this realm before they exercise their regal power' and that the crown had been offered with the Claim of Right. 115 This did not include a more The earl of Marchmont proposed a more modest set of limitations in a draft act for the Hanoverian succession in 1703. 133 Marchmont's overture focused on biennial parliamentary meetings adjourned with the consent of the assembly and parliamentary approval for the appointment of crown officers.
The successor was to be bound by these conditions and the Claim of Right. 134 148 In response, an act of the Scottish parliament asserted that, as a condition of union, Anne's successors must at their accession 'swear and subscribe the Union thus rested on an assertion of untrammelled monarchical sovereignty, overtaking a form of constitutionalism that sought to impose statutory conditions on the monarch, secured by oaths.
Though constitutionalism had served presbyterian interests in 1640-41 and 1689, episcopalian Jacobites turned to constitutionalism in order to restrict the powers of a restored Catholic monarch.
The imposition of conditions on James VII had been a possible outcome of William's landing in 1688
and Sir James Montgomery of Skelmorlie returned to this with an abortive Jacobite plot late in 1689. 156 Cavaliers supported the constitutionalist Country platform from 1703 to 1707 and earl Marischal William Keith protested for conditions of government on the successor as an alternative to incorporation in November 1706. 157 As Daniel Szechi has shown, in 1705 Scottish Jacobite leaders drafted an 'instrument of government' for a restored Stuart monarchy that demanded triennial parliaments and parliamentary consent for state officers and foreign alliances. The terms of the monarchy were to be established by a Convention, as in 1689, and secured with a binding oath of allegiance from which the people were to be released if the king broke his conditions. Termed a 'Caledonian Commonwealth' by an English spy, Szechi has characterised this programme as 'the kind of constitutional monarchy that was not to be seen in the British Isles for another hundred years'. 158 The pursuit of conditions of government by royalist Jacobites indicates the importance of confessionalism to Scottish constitutionalism in this era. A primary purpose of limitations was to restrict the monarch's ability to alter the reformed church, especially after 1603 as crown management of national assemblies increased. Though 'two kingdoms' ecclesiology rejected erastian controls, the church embraced the legitimacy provided by parliamentary ratification. 159 Constitutionalist objections to Charles I in 1637 centred on his use of the royal prerogative to introduce ecclesiastical changes. Nevertheless, this paper does not advance a claim for precocious modernity or offer comfort for a 'narrative of Scottish constitutional exceptionalism' stretching from the Declaration of Arbroath to modern written constitutions. 160 Instead, it recognises the development across the century of thoroughly early modern tactics designed to secure national interests in a regal union by using covenants and coronation oaths to confirm the constitution of a limited monarchy and reformed church in parliamentary law.
